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THE ECONOMICS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA'S THIRD GENERATION OF ANTI-
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 1989, Pennsylvania's new Business Corporation Law
took effect.1 Included in the law are previously enacted provisions2
which severely limit the ability of any party to effect a hostile takeover
of a Pennsylvania corporation. These provisions are generally referred
to as Pennsylvania's Third Generation of Anti-Takeover Legislation.
3
Pennsylvania is not the only state to enact legislation which ac-
tively curtails hostile takeovers. New York, Delaware, Wisconsin and a
number of other states have similar laws in effect," Most of these laws
pass under the rubric of "Shareholder Protection Statutes." All benefit
incumbent management to the disadvantage of prospective corporate
raiders.
During the 1960's, the tender offer replaced the traditional proxy
contest as a method for gaining control of a corporation.5 Corporate
takeovers were praised in the law and economics literature for promot-
ing efficient reallocation of economic resources and for enhancing
shareholder wealth.'
Not all commentators have such a sanguine opinion of the tender
1. Act of December 21, 1988 (P.L. 1444 No. 177), 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101-4162 (1989).
2. The primary anti-takeover provisions referred to are sections 2541 to 2548 (relating to Con-
trol Transactions), 2551 to 2556 (relating to Business Combinations), 2513 (relating to Disparate
Treatment of Certain Persons), and 2502 (relating to Registered Corporation Status), Act of March
3, 1988, No. 27, 1988 Pa. Laws 27, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2541-2548, 2551-2556, 2513 and 2502.
3. In general, and for the purposes of our discussion, "Third Generation" Anti-Takeover legis-
lation involves statutes passed subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 41 U.S. 69 (1987). "Second Generation" statutes are those
passed prior to Dynamics but subsequent to the Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982). "First Generation" statutes are those which were enacted prior to MITE.
4. Among the states which have enacted anti-takeover legislation in the wake of Dynamics are
Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988); New York, see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 912(a)(5) (McKinney 1986); and Wisconsin, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726. See also Comment,
An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Third Generation Anti-Takeover Legislation, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 721
n.4 (1989).
5. E. ARONOw, H. EINHORN & G. BERNSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR COR-
PORATE CONTROL 1-2 (1977).
6. Id.
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offer, however. The adverse impact of certain corporate takeovers on
local labor markets, the coercive effect of tender offers on shareholders,
and the high degree of financial leverage involved in most takeovers
have been criticized.' Such concerns lead to passage of legislation regu-
lating and restricting tender offers.
The first attempts by the states to regulate the tender offer fell
victim to constitutional attack. First generation anti-takeover statutes
such as Pennsylvania's 1976 Takeover Disclosure Law8 were found to
violate the federal supremacy clause,9 the commerce clause"0 or both."
Legislatures responded by enacting a second generation of anti-take-
over laws, and the United States Supreme Court sustained this kind of
legislation in 1987 in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America."
Pennsylvania enacted its third generation anti-takeover legislation
as a part of its Business Corporation Law in 1989.13 While similar in
several respects to the kind of statute upheld, in Dynamics, the Pennsyl-
vania law goes much further in restricting the tender offer. Under the
new law, hostile takeovers of Pennsylvania corporations will be virtually
eliminated.1 ' Not surprisingly, the Pennsylvania statute has come
under constitutional attack.' 5
This note will analyze the new legislation in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Dynamics, and several recent district and appellate
court decisions on third generation statutes in Delawarel e and Wiscon-
sin." The note concludes that Pennsylvania's legislation should survive
constitutional scrutiny.
7. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987).
8. Act of March 3, 1976 (P.L. 41 No. 19), PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon
Supp. 1990).
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3.
11. See Crane Co. v. Laim, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
12. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
13. Act of December 21, 1988 (P.L. 1444 No. 177), 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101-4162.
14. Comment, supra note 4.
15. First City Financial Corp. Ltd. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 89-4858 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
16. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v.
Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988).
17. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.




A. In the Beginning...
The traditional method for gaining control of a corporation is the
proxy contest."i But proxy contests are costly 9 and well-regulated
under federal law. 0 During the 1960's a new strategy, the tender offer,
was developed as an alternative for taking control of a target corpora-
tion.21 The tender offer had the advantage of being unregulated under
existing securities laws, 22 and its popularity as a strategy for the corpo-
rate raider grew through the decade.2
Hostile tender offers worked to the advantage of the corporate
raider and to the disadvantage of incumbent management and share-
holders in several ways. First, the raider could restrict the tender offer's
duration, allowing the target's management little time to analyze the
offer and make a recommendation on the offer to its shareholders.
24
Second, the raider could acquire information on the corporation's finan-
cial condition, strategic business plan and capitalization without mak-
ing similar information on its own status available to the corporation or
its shareholders. 5 This put the corporation's management and share-
holders at a disadvantage in obtaining information.26 Third, the prac-
tice of making two-tier, front-end loaded tender offers coerced share-
holders into quickly tendering their shares to the raider at less than
optimal prices.2
18. Sell, A Critical Analysis of a New Approach to State Takeover Legislation After MITE,
23 WASHBURN L.J. 473 (1984). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)
(noting that "prior to the 1960's, corporate takeover attempts had typically involved either proxy
solicitations, regulated under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78n] or exchange
offers of securities, subject to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act").
19. Sell, supra note 18. In addition to their cost, Dean Sell argues that another disadvantage
of proxy contests is that unless the proxy is coupled with an interest, it is revocable at the will of the
shareholder.
20. See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
21. See E. ARONOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERNSTEIN, supra note 5, at pp. v-vi.
22. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
23. Comment, supra note 4, at 722.
24. See BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 467 (D. Del. 1988).
25. Id.
26. Piper, 430 U.S. at 27.
27. In a "two-tier front-end loaded" tender offer, or "freezeout," the hostile raider makes a
tender offer at a certain attractive price for a specified percentage (such as 50%) of the shares of the
target corporation in the first tier of the offer. The raider expresses his intention that the remaining
shares of the target corporation will be "frozen out" at a reduced price in a subsequent merger of the
corporation. The effect of an offer of this type is to coerce the shareholders of the target corporation
to quickly accept the first offer from the raider, out of fear of being frozen out at a lower price later.
1990]
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B. Federal Legislation
The federal government acted to regulate tender offers in 1968 by
passing the Williams Act, which amended the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934.28 The Williams Act regulates the process of tender offers
and imposes certain disclosure requirements on parties making tender
offers. 9 The Act's purpose is to ensure that shareholders are provided
with sufficient information about both the tender offer and the offeror,
so that the- shareholders may make an informed decision on whether to
tender their shares.3 0 The Act expresses a policy of neutrality as be-
tween the tender offeror and incumbent management. 1
The Williams Act requires the bidder to disclose its identity and
background, the source and amount of funds or other consideration to
be used in purchasing the tendered shares, the extent of its holdings in
the target corporation, and the bidder's plans with respect to the target
corporation's business or corporate structure.32 The Act requires the
bidder to file the disclosure statement with the SEC and the target
corporation. 3
The Williams Act allows tendering shareholders to withdraw their
shares during the first seven days of the offer and at any time after
sixty days from the commencement of the tender offer. 4 If more shares
are tendered than the bidder seeks to purchase, the Act requires that
the tendered shares be purchased from each tendering shareholder on a
pro-rata basis during the first ten days of the offer.35 Additionally, if
during the course of the offer the amount paid for the shares is in-
creased, the Act requires that all tendering shareholders receive the
same consideration, even if they tendered their shares before the price
increase was announced.36
Because the Williams Act regulates only process and disclosure,
and not the substantive aspects of tender offers, target corporations
have little federal statutory protection from the hostile raider.3 " Man-
For a discussion of the coercive element of these two-tier tender offers, see Koppers, 683 F. Supp. at
468 n.23.
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f) (1981).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1981).
30. 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
31. Sell, supra note 18, at 474.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1981).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 78n(d)(5).
35. Id. § 78n(d)(6).
36. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
37. See Sell, supra note 18, at 474.
[Vol. 10:139
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agement therefore developed and implemented a number of practical
defensive techniques. These include the adoption of shareholder rights
plans, commonly known as "poison pills, '38 employee stock ownership
plans, repurchasing company stock, paying "greenmail" 9 to the raider,
providing "golden parachutes' ' 4 to top management, searching for a
"white knight,' 11  selling off the "crown jewels"4  and lobbying state
legislators to pass "shark repellant"' 3 statutes.
C. State Legislation
State legislation with respect to tender offers generally proceeds on
the premise that hostile takeovers of state-chartered corporations are
undesirable. 4 State statutes are designed to protect the corporations
and shareholders in the state, but usually have the effect of protecting
the incumbent corporate management against the hostile raider.4' State
38. Shareholder rights plans, or "poison pills" are expressly validated as a matter of state
corporation law under sections 2513 and 1525 of the 1988 Pennsylvania Business Corporation Act.
Act of Dec. 21, 1988 (P.L. 1444 No. 177), PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2513, 1525.
39. "Greenmail" refers to "[an antitakeover maneuver in which the target firm purchases the
raider's stock at a price above that available to other stockholders. The funds for the purchase are
often borrowed; other stockholders are ordinarily excluded from the transaction." D. ScoTT, WALL
STREET WORDS 159 (1988).
40. A "Golden Parachute" is "[a]n employment agreement that provides a firm's key execu-
tives with lucrative severance benefits in the event that control of the firm changes hands, and shifts
in management subsequently occur. A golden parachute benefits management more than stockhold-
ers." Id. at 157.
41. A "White Knight" is "[a] person or company that rescues a target firm from a takeover
attempt by buying the firm." Id. at 385.
42. A "crown jewel" is "[a] prized asset of a company." The term is "[o]ften used to refer to
a part of a business that is sought by another firm or an investor in a takeover attempt that is hostile
to the target firm's management.". Id. at 82. As a takeover defense, a firm may enter into a "crown
jewel lockup agreement," which is "[a] contractual offer of valuable assets or stock made by a
takeover target to the suitor deemed most acceptable to management. A lockup agreement tends to
discourage unwanted suitors but it may penalize the target firm's stockholders because it eliminates
counteroffers." Id. at 202. As an alternative to a crown jewel lockup agreement, a firm may adopt a
"scorched earth" strategy, which is "[a]n anti-takeover strategy in which the target firm disposes of
those assets or divisions considered particularly desirable by the raider. Thus, by making itself less
attractive, the target discourages the takeover attempt. Such a strategy is almost certain to penalize
the shareholders of the target firm." Id. at 311.
43. A "shark repellant" is "[a] strategy used by corporations to ward off unwanted takeovers.
Examples of shark repellants include a major acquisition, the issuance of new shares of stock or
securities convertible into stock, and the staggered election of directors. Shark repellants often bene-
fit corporate officers more than stockholders." Id. at 322. Sometimes called "show stoppers," a shark
repellant statute is "[a] legal barrier to a takeover attempt that is virtually impossible for a suitor to
overcome. For example, a target company may convince state legislators to pass various anti-take-
over laws that would preclude the takeover." Id. at 324.
44. See Sell, supra note 18, at 474.
45. Id. at 475.
1990].
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anti-takeover laws generally impose disclosure requirements on the
raider and interpose procedural steps designed to slow down the tender
procedure.46 These steps provide management with valuable time to
adopt defensive techniques to fend off the hostile raider. "7
Tender offerors attacked these statutes on two constitutional
grounds. First, the raiders argued that the Williams Act preempted the
field, and therefore state tender offer legislation violated the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 8 Second, the
raiders argued that state anti-takeover legislation was unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause. 9
The first attack was launched in Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell6 0 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the Idaho takeover statute"' was preempted by the Wil-
liams Act. 5 The court also found that the statute imposed an unrea-
sonable burden on interstate commerce." But an Ohio statute similar
to the Idaho law invalidated in Kidwell was upheld by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in AMCA Inter-
national Corp. v. Krouse.54 Thus, the federal circuits disagreed on the
constitutionality of first generation anti-takeover statutes.
Following the Krouse decision, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission enacted certain regulations under the Williams Act.6 Rule
14d-2(b) requires a tender offeror to file a schedule 14D-1 and to dis-
seminate certain information within five business days of public an-
nouncement of a tender offer. 6  Many state laws, however, required
that hearings be conducted on any tender offer. These hearings often
ran for a period longer than five days, and in some cases state law
provided for waiting periods of longer than five days before disclosure
46. Id. See also Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Con-
stitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1976).
47. See Garrett, Third Generation Anti-Takeover Statutes in Oregon and Indiana After Dy-
namics: Target Corporations Control the Ship and Raiders are Foiled, 24 WILLIAMErTrE L. REV. 73,
79 (1988).
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
50. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (improper venue).
51. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501-1513 (Supp. 1977).
52. See supra note 28.
53. 577 F.2d 1256.
54. 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979).




would be possible.5 7 It became impossible for a raider to meet the con-
flicting requirements of federal and state laws. Because of this direct
conflict in the requirements of federal and state laws, some lower courts
invalidated state statutes 58 as unconstitutional in light of the Williams
Act.59 In 1982, the United States Supreme Court resolved the conflict
between the circuits and addressed the constitutionality of a state anti-
takeover statute in Edgar v. MITE Corporation.60
D. Edgar v. MITE Corporation
In its 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,6 the United States
Supreme Court struck down, on Commerce Clause grounds, an Illinois
tender offer statute that subjected bids for locally based companies to
an intricate scheme of precommencement delay and state administra-
tive review."2 Drawing on law and economics literature emphasizing the
social value of a free market for corporate control, the court seemed to
place the nationwide securities market beyond the reach of individual
states. MITE became the authority for lower federal courts to strike
down all but the most limited efforts by the states to regulate
takeovers.63
State legislators reacted by drafting a second generation of anti-
takeover legislation designed to meet the uncertain criteria set out in
MITE.64 These new laws resembled traditional state corporation laws
more than securities regulation, and were thus likely to run afoul of the
Constitution. Typical of this second generation legislation were control
share acquisition statutes,6 5 fair price provision statutes, 66 right of re-
57. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71 to 85 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
58. For a list of state statutes invalidated, see Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation
After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporate Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REv. 3, 14 n.64
(1984).
59. Pennsylvania's First Generation statute came under constitutional attack in Crane Co. v.
Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (granting a preliminary injunction against the enforce-
ment of the Pennsylvania law on the ground that the twenty day waiting period required by the state
law was in conflict with the five-day requirement of the Williams Act).
60. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 646 (finding that the Illinois statute indirectly burdened interstate commerce, and
that the burden imposed outweighed any legitimate state interests promoted by the statute).
63. See Garrett, supra note 47.
64. Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203,
204 (1987).
65. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (Burns Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671
(West 1985 & Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1987); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985).
1990]
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demption statutes6 7 and business combination statutes. 8 Indiana's sec-
ond generation control share acquisition statute69 successfully withstood
challenge in 1987 in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America.70
E. CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America
Enacted in early 1986, the Indiana Control Share Acquisition stat-
ute7 1 at issue in Dynamics was carefully drafted to avoid the constitu-
tional defects of the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE. First, unlike
the Illinois statute, which regulated all takeover bids for companies
with certain minimum contacts in the state, the Indiana legislation was
styled as a corporation law provision, predicated on the target's status
as an Indiana corporation. Second, the Indiana legislation vests all
power in the target's shareholders. Unlike the Illinois law, it neither
gives the state administrative body the power to disapprove a bid nor
allows target management an opportunity to communicate its opposi-
tion while freezing the bidder's activities.
Under the Indiana statue, when any person obtains sufficient
shares of an "issuing public corporation" incorporated in Indiana such
that its voting interest would pass any of three threshold levels (20%,
33 1/3 % or 50% ), the ability to vote the controlling block is conditioned
on approval by a majority of the target's pre-existing "disinterested
shareholders." If the shareholders do not grant voting rights to the ac-
quirer, the target may redeem the control shares at fair market value.
The practical effect of the statute is to prevent tender offerors from
assuming immediate control of the tendered shares.
On March 10, 1986, Dynamics Corporation announced a tender
offer for CTS shares, which, if successful, would have increased Dy-
namics' ownership interest in CTS from 9.6% to 27.5%. The CTS
board reacted by electing to be governed by the new Indiana statute. In
early April, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois granted Dynamics' motion for declaratory relief." The court
found that the Indiana statute violated the supremacy clause because it
66. See, e.g., MD. CORPS, & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601-3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
67. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1408(B), 1409(C), 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1986).
68. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-43 (Burns Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271A.397(3) (Baldwin Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(5) (McKinney 1986).
69. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 (West Supp. 1987).
70. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
71. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 (West Supp. 1987).
72. 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. I11. 1986).
[Vol. 10:139
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frustrates (largely through delay) the balance that Congress intends in
the Williams Act among shareholder, bidder and management inter-
ests. The court also found a Commerce Clause violation. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling on
both counts.
The Supreme Court reversed. First, the Court found that compli-
ance with the Indiana Act and the Williams Act was "entirely possi-
ble."'73 The only preemption question, therefore, was whether the Indi-
ana Act violated "the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
7 4
Applying, without endorsing, Justice White's preemption analysis from
MITE, the Court concluded that none of the offending features of the
Illinois Act in MITE were present in the Indiana Act, and that, even
under the MITE plurality's broad articulation of the Williams Act's
purposes, the Indiana law passed muster.
76
Next, the Court turned to the Commerce Clause challenge. The
majority noted that the statute did not discriminate against interstate
commerce because it applied equally to both resident and foreign bid-
ders.76 Further, the Court found that the statute did not subject inter-
state activities to inconsistent regulation because the act only applies to
Indiana domestic corporations.7
Finally, the Court addressed the merits of the statute. Signifi-
cantly, the Court declined to balance the statute's putative local bene-
fits against the burdens it imposed on interstate commerce as it had
done in MITE. Instead, the Dynamics Court simply observed that a
system that gives states the power to create corporate entities necessa-
rily gives them the power to establish rights and responsibilities among
the various interests in the corporate structure. Corporation laws inevi-
tably affect interstate commerce in certain ways, but this alone does
not affect their constitutional validity.78 Giving deference to the "em-
pirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation,"
the Court found that the Indiana statute was rationally related to the
exercise of this power because it was a nondiscriminatory procedure
73. Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 79.
74. Id. (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)); Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
75. Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 81-82.
76. "The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not,
by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce." Dynamics, 481 U.S. at
88.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
1990]
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designed to preserve "an effective voice in corporate affairs" for the
shareholders."9 Moreover, even if the statute had the effect of decreas-
ing the number of tender offers for Indiana corporations, the Court
concluded that it would be valid under the Commerce Clause.
Dynamics paved the way for a number of states, including Penn-
sylvania, to enact a third generation of anti-takeover legislation."0 Two
of these statutes were upheld in 1989 in Delaware8 l and Wisconsin.
82
Pennsylvania's new law was subjected to attack in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."
F. The Delaware Cases
In 1988, Delaware enacted the Delaware Business Combination
statute,8 4 which was modeled after the kind of second generation stat-
ute pioneered in New York. 3 Section 203 of the Delaware statute gen-
erally prohibits a "business combination," broadly defined, between an
"interested stockholder" and the target corporation for a three-year pe-
riod, unless one of the exceptions to the statute applies. Only two ex-
ceptions apply to a hostile raider, however, and both are restrictive to
the point of making them practically illusory.
First, the restriction on business combinations does not apply if the
interested stockholder acquires at least 85 % of the outstanding voting
stock of the corporation, exclusive of shares owned by director-officers
and certain employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Second, the re-
striction falls if the interested stockholder's proposed business transac-
tion is approved by the board of directors and is authorized by an af-
firmative vote of at least 66 2/3 % of the outstanding voting stock that is
not owned by the interested stockholder.
The Delaware statute was quickly challenged on constitutional
grounds in two separate actions.86 In BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc.,
87
79. Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 91-92.
80. See supra note 2.
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
82. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 et seq. (West 1989-1990).
83. First City Financial Corp. Ltd. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 89-4858 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (WESTLAW, DCT DATABASE).
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
85. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(5) (McKinney 1986).
.86. The first action, BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) will provide
the basis for the discussion which follows. The second action, RP Acquisition Corp. v. Stanley Conti-
nental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988) was decided on similar grounds and will not, therefore,
be discussed in the same degree of detail.
87. 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
[Vol. 10:139
PENNSYLVANIA'S ANTI-TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
the hostile raider, BNS, sought an order declaring the Delaware statute
unconstitutional on federal preemption and Commerce Clause grounds.
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware refused
to enjoin enforcement of the statute, holding that even though the stat-
ute may have a substantial deterrent effect on tender offers, it did not
circumvent the policy of the Williams Act as long as offers which are
beneficial to target shareholders have a meaningful opportunity for suc-
cess.88 Finding further that the statute did not discriminate between
offerors which were Delaware corporations and offerors which were not
incorporated there, and finding that the statute promoted stable corpo-
rate relationships and protected shareholders, the court held that BNS
was unlikely to prevail on the merits* of its Commerce Clause
challenge. 9
The Koppers court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision
in Dynamics, which, the court said, "unmistakably teaches that states
have a legitimate interest in regulating tender offers, despite the signifi-
cant influence such regulation has over the transfer of securities and
the so-called market for corporate control." 90
Following Justice Powell's preemption analysis in Dynamics, the
court found that whether the Delaware statute frustrates the purposes
of the Williams Act may be determined by asking four questions.91
First, does the statute protect independent shareholders from coercion?
Second, does the statute give either management or the offeror an ad-
vantage in communicating with shareholders? Third, does the statute
impose an indefinite or unreasonable delay on offers? Fourth, does the
statute allow the state government to interpose its views of fairness be-
tween willing buyers and sellers?92
First, the court found that the Delaware statute "offers protection
to independent shareholders by preventing certain dealings between a
successful offeror and the target corporation" which would be harmful
to shareholders, such as freezeouts and leveraged buyouts.9 Next, the
court held that while the statute gives the target's management an ad-
vantage in fighting an unwanted takeovers, Dynamics suggests that in-
cidentally pro-management measures undertaken to benefit sharehold-
88. Id. at 469.
89. Id. at 472.
90. Id. at 469 (citing Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 85-86, 93).
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ers do not offend Williams Act policies. 4 Third, the court found that
although the Delaware statute delays the acquisition of full control fol-
lowing purchase for three years if no exception applies, the delay was
"not troublesome for preemption purposes."" This is so, the court said,
because under pre-existing and accepted corporation law in Delaware,
a staggered board delays shifts of control for two years, and the addi-
tional one-year delay imposed by section 203 is minimal.96 Finally, the
court found that the Delaware statute does not interpose the state gov-
ernment's views of fairness between willing buyers and sellers,9" a char-
acteristic which proved fatal to the Illinois statute in MITE.
The second prong of BNS's constitutional attack met with similar
results. Here, the court applied the three-step Commerce Clause in-
quiry set out in Dynamics.98 The three-part test inquires: (1) whether
the effects of the statute are discriminatory; (2) whether the statute
creates an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation; and (3)
whether the statute promotes stable corporate relationships and pro-
tects shareholders.
99
First, the court found that section 203 does not discriminate be-
tween offerors which are Delaware corporations and those which are
not incorporated in Delaware. 100 Second, the court held that the mere
fact that many Delaware corporations do not have their principal of-
fices or many of their shareholders within Delaware does not inevitably
create a risk of inconsistent regulation. 10 1 Finally, the court found that
the Delaware statute promotes stable corporate relationships and pro-
tects shareholders, and dismissed an argument that the law's real pur-
pose was to protect state revenues. 10 "The statute's furtherance of Del-
aware's pecuniary interest does not automatically render it
unconstitutional . . ..." the court held. "While the legislative history of
section 203 is not free of protectionist sentiment, neither is it devoid of
concern for the group putatively benefitted-the stockholders of Dela-
ware corporations. It is manifestly not this Court's place to reject the
legislature's offered justification for section 203 absent clear proof that
94. Id.
95. Id. at 470.
96. Id. at 469.
97. Id.




102. Id. at 473.
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this justification is only a pretense. Such proof is missing." 103
Thus, in both Koppers and its companion case, RP Acquisition
Corp. v. Stanley Continental, Inc.,104 the district court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Delaware Business Combination statute. Similar
challenges were soon mounted against the Wisconsin"°5 and Pennsylva-
nia statutes."°6
G. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.
In May, 1989 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Wis-
consin's third-generation anti-takeover statute."0 7 Enacted after Dy-
namics, the Wisconsin law postpones the kinds of transactions which
often follow, and are the reasons for, corporate takeovers. Unless the
target's board agrees to the transaction in advance, the bidder must
wait three years after buying the shares to merge with the target or
acquire more than 5% of its assets.
Similar in many respects to the Pennsylvania legislation discussed
below, Wisconsin's law provides that no firm incorporated in Wisconsin
and having its headquarters, substantial operations, or 10% of its
shares or shareholders there may "engage in a business combination
with an interested stockholder . . . for three years after the interested
stockholder's stock acquisition date unless the board of directors of the
corporation has approved, before the interested stockholder's stock ac-
quisition date, that business combination or the purchase of stock."' 08
An "interested stockholder" is defined as one which owns 10% of the
voting stock of the corporation either directly or in concert with any
other party.10 9 A "business combination" is a merger with the bidder or
any of its affiliates, sale of more than 5 % of the assets to the bidder or
affiliate, liquidation of the target, or a transaction by which the target
guarantees the bidder's or its affiliates' debts or passes tax benefits to
the bidder or its affiliates." 0 Unless the target's board agrees to the
plan beforehand, the statute provides for an absolute ihree-year mora-
103. Id. at 473 n.31.
104. 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988).
105. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 107 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1989).
106. First City Financial Corp. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 89-4858 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(WESTLAW, DCT DATABASE).
107. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.726.
108. Id. § 180.726(2).
109. Id. § 180.726(1)(j).
110. Id. § 180.726(1)(e).
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torium on business combinations between bidder and target. This re-
quirement is even more restrictive than the Delaware law, where ob-
taining 85% of the shares owned by non-management shareholders
provides an exception to the ban on business combinations."' In Wis-
consin, even acquiring 100% of non-management held shares would
not lift the bar."' In addition, Wisconsin corporations cannot opt out of
the law's provisions, as corporations can do in most other states, includ-
ing Delaware and Pennsylvania. As a practical matter, Wisconsin's
statute eliminates hostile leveraged buyouts." 8
On December 1, 1988, Amanda Acquisition Corporation, a shell
corporation formed to acquire Universal Foods Corporation, com-
menced a tender offer for at least 75 % of the shares of Universal. The
deal was structured as a leveraged buyout. Chase Manhattan Bank had
agreed to lend Amanda 50% of the cost of the acquisition, to be se-
cured by Universal stock, " 4 contingent upon a prompt merger of
Amanda and Universal. Amanda's offer to Universal's shareholders
was conditioned on a judicial declaration that the Wisconsin law was
invalid.11 5 Amanda promptly filed suit seeking a declaration that the
law was preempted by the Williams Act and inconsistent with the
Commerce Clause. "
The district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, "
finding the statute constitutional and not preempted. The court found
that under Wisconsin law directors are entitled to prevent investors
from accepting tender offers of which the directors do not approve.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,11 8 finding that the
Wisconsin law was neither preempted by the Williams Act, nor in vio-
lation of the Commerce Clause. As an initial matter, however,, the
court attacked the economic wisdom of anti-takeover legislation. "If
our views of the wisdom of state law mattered, Wisconsin's takeover
statute would not survive," because in the court's view "anti-takeover
legislation injures shareholders."11 9 Drawing on law and economics
literature, the court observed that a statute which prevents sharehold-
111. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 498.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 499.
114. Id. at 498.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 499.
117. 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
118. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
119. Id. at 500.
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ers from receiving the benefit of premium offers for their shares makes
them worse off.120 "It makes the economy worse off too, because the
higher bid reflects the better use to which the bidder can put the tar-
get's assets."' 1 Citing studies of anti-takeover legislation similar to
Wisconsin's, "'22 the court concluded that "share prices of firms incorpo-
rated in the state drop when the legislation is enacted."' 23
Despite reservations about the economic wisdom of Wisconsin's
legislation, the court recognized that "[s]kepticism about the wisdom of
a state's law does not lead to the conclusion that the law is beyond the
state's power." '24 Noting that unless the Constitution or some federal
law bars the way, the court observed that "Wisconsin's choice must be
respected."' 25
Amanda first challenged the statute on federal preemption
grounds, claiming that in the Williams Act Congress had created an
entitlement for investors to receive the benefit of tender offers, and that
since Wisconsin's law makes tender offers unattractive to potential bid-
ders, it is in conflict with the federal policy. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals disagreed. The Williams Act regulates only the process of
tender offers and provides for disclosure requirements, the court ob-
served. The Wisconsin law makes a takeover bid for a Wisconsin corpo-
ration unattractive, but since the statute leaves the process alone once a
bidder appears, the court held that the Wisconsin law could coexist
with the Williams Act.
126
Next, Amanda argued that the Wisconsin statute violated the
Commerce Clause. 127 Once again, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals disagreed. Applying the rationale developed in Dynamics, the
court held that "[b]ecause nothing in the [Wisconsin] law imposes a
greater burden on out-of-state offerors than it does on similarly situated
[Wisconsin] offerors, we reject the contention that the Act discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce." What is noteworthy about the
court's Commerce Clause discussion is that it expressly rejected the
"meaningful opportunity for success" test applied in the Delaware
120. Id. at 500-502.
121. Id. at 500.
122. Id. at 501.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 502.
125. Id. In the final paragraph of its opinion the Seventh Circuit, quoting language from Jus-
tice Scalia's concurring opinion in Dynamics, observed that "[a] law can be both economic folly and
constitutional." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 96-97 (1987).
126. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 502-503.
127. Id. at 505.
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cases. 2 8
In those cases, the district judges sustained the Delaware anti-
takeover statute, at least in part, because under the law obtaining 85 %
of the shares owned by non-management shareholders provides an ex-
ception to the ban on business combinations. In Wisconsin, however,
even acquiring 100% of non-management held shares would not lift
the bar. Unless the target's board has previously agreed to the plan, the
statute provides for an absolute three-year moratorium on business
combinations between bidder and target. Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "the Commerce Clause does
not demand that states leave bidders a 'meaningful opportunity for suc-
cess'."12 9 Despite the court's unfavorable opinion about the economic
wisdom of the statute, Wisconsin's third generation anti-takeover stat-
ute survived attack.
III. PENNSYLVANIA'S THIRD GENERATION ANTI-TAKEOVER
LEGISLATION
A. Provisions of the Law
Pennsylvania elected to codify its anti-takeover statute as part of
its newly enacted Business Corporation Law in 1988.180 The provisions
took effect on March 30, 1989.131 Pennsylvania's statute is modeled af-
ter the Delaware and New York approach to preventing certain "busi-
ness combinations""3 2 between target corporations and "interested
shareholders"' 33 from taking place, absent board approval. In addition,
the Pennsylvania law includes provisions which take effect whenever a
"control transaction ' 3"- occurs.
128. Id. at 508.
129. Id.
130. The legislation is substantially a reenactment of former section 910 of the 1933 Business
Corporation Law, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1910 (1983) (repealed 1988).
131. The anti-takeover provisions referred to are sections 2541 to 2548 (relating to Control
Transactions), 2551 to 2556 (relating to Business Combinations), 2513 (relating to Disparate Treat-
ment of Certain Persons) and 2502 (relating to Registered Corporation Status), Act of Dec. 21,
1988, No. 107, 1988 Pa. Laws 103, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2541-2548, 2551-2556, 2513, 2502
(Supp. 1990).
132. The term "business combination" is defined in 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2554.
133. The term "interested shareholder" is defined in 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2553.
134. The term "control transaction" is defined in 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2542 as "[tihe acqui-
sition by a person or group of the status of a controlling person or group." Id. It is perhaps signifi-
cant that the definition is status driven rather than transaction driven. Taken together with the
definition of a "Controlling Person or Group" in § 2543, some interesting results could conceivably
occur. A "Controlling Person or Group" means a person or group of persons acting in concert that
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1. Business Combination Provisions
Under Pennsylvania's law, a "registered corporation"1 85 may not
engage in any "business combination" with an "interested shareholder"
for five years from the "interested shareholder's share acquisition
date"136 unless certain exceptions apply. A "registered corporation" is
generally defined as a domestic business corporation, or a wholly owned
subsidiary of a domestic business corporation, which has a class or se-
ries of shares entitled to vote generally in the election of directors of
the corporation registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
A "business combination" is defined broadly under the statute to
include any merger or consolidation of the corporation with the inter-
ested shareholder. Included within the definition are subsidiaries, affili-
ates or associates of the corporation and the interested shareholder. In
addition, the definition encompasses any sale, lease, mortgage, pledge,
transfer or other disposition of 10%- or more of the assets, earning
power or net income of the corporation to the interested shareholder.
Moreover, if the corporation issues or transfers 5 % or more of the mar-
ket value of its shares to the interested shareholder, or if it extends any
loans, advances, guarantees, pledges, financial assistance, tax credits or
tax advantages to the interested shareholder its actions will fall within
the definition of a "business combination." Finally, if the corporation
adopts any plan for its dissolution or liquidation, or reclassification of
securities or recapitalization in conjunction with an interested share-
holder, such action would be encompassed by the statute's definition of
'a "business combination."
The term "interested shareholder" is defined to mean any person
(other than the corporation or its subsidiaries) that is the beneficial
owner of 20 % or more of the voting shares of the corporation.
Pennsylvania's law provides for a five-year moratorium on business
combinations between a target corporation and an interested share-
holder, absent board approval or certain exceptions.13 7 The first excep-
has voting power over voting shares that would entitle the holders to cast at least 20% of the votes.
Id. Under this definition it would be possible for a group of persons, without transacting to buy or
sell a single share in the corporation,-to trigger the provisions of this subchapter simply by "acting in
concert." One must wonder whether a business lunch between two persons, each of whom owns 10%
of the voting stock of a Pennsylvania corporation, for the purpose of discussing corporate affairs,
would rise to the level of an act "in concert" so as to trigger a control transaction and thereby
subject these two to demand for fair value by the remaining shareholders.
135. The term "registered corporation" is defined in 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502.
136. The term "Share Acquisition Date" is defined in 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2552.
137. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2555.
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tion is made for an interested shareholder who has acquired 80% or
more of the voting shares."' In that event, if a majority of the disinter-
ested shareholders approve of the business combination at a meeting
called no earlier than three months after the interested shareholder
passes the 80% threshold, then the five-year ban is waived. Second, the
restriction is lifted if 100% of the outstanding shares vote in favor of
the business combination. 18 9 If neither of these exceptions apply, and in
the absence of board approval, the interested shareholder must wait for
five years before any business combination can be consummated.
2. Control Transaction Provisions
Subchapter E of the statute"10 provides that in the event of a "con-
trol transaction,""' shareholders of the corporation are entitled to de-
mand "fair value"" 2 for their shares from the "controlling person or
group.""" A "control transaction" is defined as the acquisition by a
person or group of the status of 'a controlling person or group. A "con-
trolling person or group" means a person, or a group of persons "acting
in concert," having voting power over 20 % or more of the voting shares
of the corporation.
The statute provides that in the event of a control transaction, the
controlling person or group must give prompt notice of that fact to each
shareholder of record and to the court."'' The notice to the sharehold-
ers must state that all shareholders are'entitled to demand that they be
paid fair value for their shares. Upon written demand by a shareholder,
the controlling person or group must pay the fair value of the shares to
the shareholder." 5 The statute provides a procedure for determining
the "fair value" of the shares,"' but generally, the minimum value the
shareholder can receive is the highest price paid per share by the con-
trolling person or group within the 90-day period ending on and includ-
ing the date of the control transaction.
138. Id. § 2555(2)(i).
139. Id. § 2555(2)(ii).
140. Id. §§ 2541-2548.
141. See supra note 133.
142. The term "Fair Value" is defined at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2542.
143. The term "Controlling Person or Group" is defined at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2543. See
also supra note 133.
144. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2545 (1988).
145. Id. § 2546.




In addition to the provisions restricting business combinations and
control transactions, two other sections of the Pennsylvania law are
noteworthy. First, as a further deterrent to hostile takeovers, the legis-
lation expressly validates as a matter of state corporation law the adop-
tion of shareholder rights plans, or "poison pills," including the provi-
sions of such plans commonly referred to as "flip-ins" and "flip-
overs." '147 Second, the law provides that the board of directors may, in
determining the best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of
any action upon employees, customers, suppliers and the local commu-
nities in which the corporation's offices or other establishments are lo-
cated. 148 Thus, in evaluating a tender offer, the board may look beyond
the shareholders' best interests and consider the interests of local
constituencies.
B. The First City Challenge
Beginning in April, 1989, First City Financial Corporation ("First
City"), individually and through its subsidiaries and affiliates, acquired
shares in Armstrong World Industries, Inc. ("Armstrong"), a Pennsyl-
vania corporation, and indicated to Armstrong's officers and directors
its interest in acquiring the corporation in a negotiated merger or other
business combination. 4" In response, Armstrong's board authorized an
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) to purchase a newly issued
147. Section 2513 read in conjunction with 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1525 (1988). See Commit-
tee Comment to 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2513 (Purdon's 1990 Pamphlet). A "poison pill" is
"[a]n anti-takeover tactic in which warrants are issued to a firm's stockholders, giving them the right
to purchase shares of the firm's stock at a bargain price in the event that a suitor hostile to manage-
ment acquires a stipulated percentage of the firm's stock. The poison pill is intended to make the
takeover so unpalatably expensive that any attempt to take control will be abandoned." D. ScoTr,
supra note 39, at 262. A "flip-in" or "flip-over pill" is "[a]n entitlement granted by a firm's manage-
ment to its stockholders giving them the right to purchase shares of an acquiring company's stock at
a bargain price in the event of a merger. The flip-over pill is a variation of the poison pill. The
difference between the two is that a poison pill allows stockholders to purchase additional shares of
the target firm's stock rather than shares of the acquiring firm's stock." Id. at 140. In an extreme
case, the company may adopt a "suicide pill," defined as "[a] poison pill provision so devastating to
the target of a takeover attempt that the target company may have to be liquidated to satisfy its
creditors. For example, the company's directors may institute a suicide pill giving stockholders the
right to exchange their stock for debt if a raider acquires more than a specified percentage of the
company's outstanding shares. The tremendous increase in debt will effectively doom the target com-
pany if the takeover attempt is successful." Id. at 343.
148. 15 PA. Co Ns. STAT. ANN. § 1721(c) (Purdon 1990); id. § 511(b).
149. Plaintiff's Complaint at pp. 19-20; First City Financial Corp. v. Armstrong World Indus.,
No. 89-4858 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (WESTLAW, DCT DATABASE).
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series of convertible preferred stock convertible into 12% of Arm-
strong's outstanding common stock. 5' The board also authorized a
common stock repurchase program designed to repurchase up to
8,000,000 of the outstanding shares of Armstrong at market prices in
unsolicited open-market or private transactions.
1 51
In March of 1989, Armstrong's board authorized a "poison pill"
shareholder rights plan, which would dilute the common stock upon the
happening of a "triggering event," such as a tender offer not approved
by the board.' 52 Faced with these defensive tactics, First City engaged
in discussions with commercial banks and other financial institutions
regarding the financing of a tender offer to Armstrong's sharehold-
ers. "'53 Pennsylvania's new statute, however, stood in their way.
On July 3, 1989, First City brought an action against Armstrong
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania asking that the Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Statute be declared
unconstitutional, and requesting an injunction against its enforcement
by the state."5 4 First City challenged the law on two grounds. First, it
alleged that the statute violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion of the United States and was preempted by the Williams Act. Sec-
ond, the law was attacked as an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
First City withdrew its suit against Armstrong in 1990, but a con-
sideration of the constitutional questions raised in its complaint re-
mains a timely and important issue.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. The Preemption Argument
1. The Williams Act and the Supremacy Clause
The starting point for the preemption argument is the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution of the United States 5 and the Williams
Act of 1968.156 Since the Williams Act regulates the conduct of tender
offers, an argument can be articulated that Congress intended through
the Williams Act to preempt the field. State legislation which conflicts
150. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1 21.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 71-75.
153. Id. at V 23.
154. First City, No. 89-4858.
155. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f) (1981).
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with the express provisions of the federal legislation is therefore uncon-
stitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Since the provisions of Penn-
sylvania's Anti-Takeover Statute practically eliminate the possibility of
a successful tender offer in the absence of board approval, the state law
conflicts with the Williams Act and should therefore be found
unconstitutional.
Preemption has not won easy acceptance in the courts for a num-
ber of reasons. First, there is section 28(a) of the 1934 Securities Act,
which provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdic-
tion of the securities commission . . . of any State over any security or
any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this
chapter . . . .",'5 Since the S.E.C. has not passed regulations concern-
ing mergers and control transactions, the States have traditionally used
the language of section 28(a) to carry out "merit regulation" of securi-
ties, or "blue sky" laws which allow securities commissioners to forbid
sales altogether, in contrast with the federal statute which emphasizes
disclosure. 158 Since section 28(a) allows states to stop these transac-
tions, which federal law would permit, there is no reason to believe that
a different result would obtain with respect to Pennsylvania's business
combination or control transaction provisions, which merely restrict,
but do not forbid sales of securities.
Next, there is the traditional reluctance of federal courts to infer
preemption of "state laws in areas traditionally regulated by the
States."' 59 Corporation laws are in the category of areas traditionally
regulated by the states, and since Pennsylvania's statute is written as a
corporation, rather than a securities, law the courts should be reluctant
to infer federal preemption in this area.
The best argument for preemption is that the practical effect of
the Pennsylvania statute violates the Williams Act's policy of neutrality
between bidder and management. But to say that Congress wanted to
be neutral between bidder and management is not to say that it also
forbids states toexpress a.different policy in their laws. "Of course it is
a big leap from saying that the Williams Act does not itself exhibit
much hostility to tender offers to saying that it implicitly forbids states
to adopt more hostile regulations ....
157. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1989),
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The Williams Act regulates the process of tender offers, slowing
things down to allow shareholders time to evaluate the offer and man-
agement's response. Nothing in the Pennsylvania statute, however, runs
afoul of the federal process requirements. Rather, the Pennsylvania law
addresses itself more to the substance and effect of proposed business
combinations. This being the case, it is "entirely possible" '161 to meet
both the requirements of the Pennsylvania law and the Williams Act.
Viewed from this perspective, the Pennsylvania statute is entirely con-
sistent with federal legislation, and is therefore not unconstitutional
under the Supremacy Clause.
2. The Dynamics Analysis
Any serious analysis of the preemption argument must consider
the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in Dynamics. There the
Court found that whether the Delaware statute frustrates the purposes
of the Williams Act may be determined by asking four questions. First,
does the statute protect independent shareholders from coercion? Sec-
ond, does the statute give either management or the offeror an advan-
tage in communicating with shareholders? Third, does the statute im-
pose an indefinite or unreasonable delay on offers? Fourth, does the
statute allow the state government to interpose its views of fairness be-
tween willing buyers and sellers? 162
a. The First Inquiry
Turning to the first inquiry, the Pennsylvania statute offers protec-
tion to independent' shareholders by preventing certain dealings be-
tween a successful offeror and the target corporation which would be
potentially harmful to shareholders, such as freezeouts and leveraged
buyouts. Two-tier tender offers, which have been criticized as being co-
ercive of shareholders, are effectively eliminated by the Fair Value pro-
visions of the law.16 The requirements for either board approval or a
supermajority vote on proposals for business combinations effectively
insulates independent shareholders from the coercive effects of a tender
offer. Thus, the statute passes the first test.
161. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987).
162. BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 469 (D. Del. 1988) (citing Dynamics, 481
U.S. at 82-84).
163. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2541-2548 (Purdon 1990).
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b. The Second Inquiry
While the statute' gives the target management an advantage in
fighting an unwanted takeover, Dynamics suggests that incidentally
pro-management measures undertaken to benefit shareholders do not
offend Williams Act policies. The underlying purpose of the Williams
Act is to ensure that shareholders have sufficient information and time
in which to make an informed decision on whether to tender their
shares."" Pennsylvania's statute does nothing to shorten the time or
reduce the amount of information which the shareholders are given by
the Williams Act. Under Dynamics, the mere fact that the Pennsylva-
nia law gives target management an advantage in fighting a hostile
tender. offer is not fatal, as long as the incidentally pro-management
measures are undertaken to benefit the shareholders.
What is unclear after Dynamics is specifically what types of mea-
sures will be considered as "undertaken to benefit the shareholders,"
and which measures will be seen as 'entrenching management.
Pennsylvania's statute specifically authorizes corporate boards to
adopt shareholder rights plans, or "poison pills," including plans with
provisions for "flip-in" and "flip-over" rights. 165 Such plans dilute the
common stock when the rights are exercised, and have the practical
effect of making a corporate takeover much more costly to the raider.
Since this makes the corporation less attractive to any potential bidder,
shareholders in corporations which have adopted "poison pill" plans are
less likely to receive a premium offer for their shares than they would
be had their corporation not -adopted such a plan. "Poison pills," and
the statute which authorizes them can therefore be seen as depriving
shareholders of the premium value of their shares. Since the premium
value of a share of common stock. is a property interest in that share,
adoption of a statutorily authorized "poison pill" plan might be seen as
a "taking" of property without due process. At a minimum, one might
question whether such plans are legitimately in the best interest of the
shareholders, or whether they actually serve management's interest in
entrenching itself.
The Pennsylvania statute also authorizes corporate boards to con-
sider the effects of any action upon its employees and the commu-
nity.16 Measures adopted by a corporate board pursuant to this section
164. " 13 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
165. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2513 (Purdon 1990) read in conjunction with 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1525 (Purdon 1990).
166. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1721(c) (Purdon 1990); id. § 511(b).
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of the statute would be contrary to the second preemption inquiry in
Dynamics which requires that incidentally pro-management measures
be undertaken for the benefit of the shareholders, not local constituen-
cies. After Dynamics, it seems that measures adopted by corporate
boards are subject to a case-by-case determination of whether they
were undertaken to benefit shareholders, local constituencies or
management.
c. The Third Inquiry
The third prong of the Dynamics inquiry is best examined by con-
sidering the Koppers application of the test to the Delaware law. The
court there found that although the Delaware statute delays the acqui-
sition of full control following purchase for three years if no exception
applies, the delay was "not troublesome for preemption purposes."' 6"
This is so, the court said, because under pre-existing and accepted cor-
poration law in Delaware, a staggered board delays shifts of control for
two years, and the additional one-year delay imposed by section 203 is
minimal.16 8 The Pennsylvania law delays acquisition of full control for
five years, absent board approval or certain exceptions. Since Pennsyl-
vania allows staggered terms of directors which would delay acquisition
of full control for up to three years, the five-year provision of the anti-
takeover statute would add an additional two-year delay. If a one-year
delay is not "troublesome" in Delaware, is a two-year delay "trouble-
some" in Pennsylvania, so as to impose an indefinite or unreasonable
delay on offers? Given that legislatures are to be afforded deference in
matters of state law, it would be difficult for a court to substitute its
own judgment on this issue for that of the Pennsylvania legislature.
Hence, the statute should pass the third test.
d. The Fourth Inquiry
The final preemption inquiry is whether the Pennsylvania statute
interposes the state government's views of fairness between willing buy-
ers and sellers. In Koppers, the court found that the Delaware statute
did not. The Pennsylvania statute contains no provision for administra-
tive review, as in MITE, which could be found to be offensive to a free
market for shares. The statute may make it much less attractive for a
bidder to make a hostile tender offer, but bidders may still make bids




and shareholders are still free to accept or reject those bids in Pennsyl-
vania, free from state interference.
As reiterated by the Koppers court, the decision in Dynamics "un-
mistakably teaches that states have a legitimate interest in regulating
tender offers, despite the significant influence such regulation has over
the transfer of securities and the so-called market for corporate con-
trol."1 69 Pennsylvania's anti-takeover statute should pass muster on the
preemption challenge.
B. The Commerce Clause Argument
The second argument made against Pennsylvania's Anti-Takeover
legislation is that its provisions impermissibly burden interstate com-
merce in contravention of the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. Similar arguments made against the Indiana, Delaware
and Wisconsin statutes have failed to persuade the courts that such a
burden exists.
Under the Court's decision in Dynamics, a three-step inquiry is
made to evaluate whether the statute in question violates the Com-
merce Clause. The three-part test inquires: (1) whether the effects of
the statute are discriminatory; (2) whether the statute creates an im-
pressible risk of inconsistent regulation; and (3) whether the statute
promotes stable corporate relationships and protects shareholders.'
First, Pennsylvania's legislation does not discriminate between of-
ferors which are Pennsylvania corporations and those which are not in-
corporated in Pennsylvania. The mere fact that most bidders may be
foreign is unpersuasive. The plain fact of the matter is that domestic
bidders and foreign bidders are treated identically under the law.
Therefore, the effects of Pennsylvania's statute are not discriminatory.
Second, the mere fact that many Pennsylvania corporations do not
have their principal offices or many of their shareholders within the
state of Pennsylvania does not inevitably create a risk of inconsistent
regulation. Even if a conflict would arise between the laws of Pennsyl-
vania and the laws of another jurisdiction, conflict of laws principles
could be used to resolve these differences. Moreover, the anti-takeover
provision has no greater potential for inconsistency with the laws of
sister states than do other provisions of Pennsylvania's corporation law.
Therefore, the Pennsylvania statute does not create an impermissible
169. Id. at 468-69 (citing Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 85-86).
170. 481 U.S. at 85-94.
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risk of inconsistent regulation.
Finally, the Pennsylvania statute promotes stable corporate rela-
tionships and protects shareholders. Those that attack the law as a
management entrenchment statute as much as concede the first point.
Theirs is the argument favoring change over stability. The second point
is the more oblique, since it begs the question: "protect shareholders
from what?" The history of federal and state legislation on the subject
is persuasive that such laws are designed to protect shareholders from
the coercive aspects of tender offers. Those that argue against the law
have conceded this point as well, since the thrust of their contention is
that Pennsylvania's law affords shareholders too much protection from
tender offers by practically eliminating any offer which does not have
the board's seal of approval.
Like the Indiana, Delaware and Wisconsin statutes before it,
Pennsylvania's third generation anti-takeover legislation should survive
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania's third generation anti-takeover legislation, codified
as part of the 1988 Business Corporation Law, is clearly a pro-manage-
ment statute. Under its provisions, a bidder for corporate control will
be forced to deal with incumbent management. The alternative to ob-
taining board approval of a tender offer will be to wait the statutory
five-year period before a second step merger or other business combina-
tion can be completed. The Act also effectively prevents shareholders
from organizing to oust existing management 'even where no shares are
being purchased or sold by the group, and no corporate takeover is con-
templated. The statute may ultimately prove beneficial to shareholders,
provided that incumbent management acts in the shareholders' best in-
terests. Alternatively, the law and economics commentators may prove
to be correct, and the statute may have the effect of entrenching in-
cumbent management, ossifying scarce resources which could be put to
better use, and depressing share prices to the disadvantage of share-
holders. This question may take years to answer. One result is almost
certain: hostile takeovers of Pennsylvania corporations will be effec-
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tively eliminated. Given the Supreme Court's decision in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, the Delaware cases and the Seventh Cir-
cuit's opinion in Amanda Acquisition v. Universal Foods, the Pennsyl-
vania statute will almost certainly be upheld.
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